No. 138 (Management of Terrorist Incidents Involving Radioactive Material) was the high priority it accorded to psychosocial and communication issues. While previous discussions of radiological and nuclear terrorism had occasionally referred to these topics, NCRP Report No. 138 was the first report of its kind to recognize the profound challenges posed by these issues and to place them at the heart of preparedness and response efforts. In the years since the report's release, a host of important developments have taken place in relation to psychosocial and communication issues. This paper reviews key changes and advances in five broad areas: (1) training exercises, (2) policy and guidance development, (3) 
INTRODUCTION

IN MANY ways, the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements' (NCRP) Report No. 138 (Management of Terrorist Incidents Involving Radioactive
Material, October 2001) was a groundbreaking document. Employing an integrated, multidisciplinary approach, the report provided the first comprehensive examination of the crisis and consequence management challenges posed by the radiological and nuclear terrorism threat.
While previous discussions of radiological and nuclear terrorism had occasionally referred to psychosocial and communication issues, NCRP Report No. 138 was the first document of its kind to place these issues at the very heart of its analysis. As the report emphasized, social, psychological, behavioral, and communication issues are absolutely central to the success or failure of preparedness and response efforts.
In the years since the report's 2001 release, a host of important developments have taken place in relation to psychosocial and communication issues. These developments and their implications are the focus of this article. Five broad areas are examined: training exercises, where some efforts are now being made to increase realism by incorporating psychosocial considerations; new policy and guidance development related to psychosocial and communication issues; federally-sponsored roundtables that have improved our understanding of hospital and clinician needs with respect to radiological terrorism; survey research findings, which have improved our understanding of people's perceptions of the radiological terrorism threat; and risk communication for radiological and nuclear terrorism situations. As part of the last item, information will be presented on the Pre-Event Message Development Project. This multi-year, federally-funded risk communication research and message development effort was begun in 2002 and remains active today. It has dramatically increased our knowledge of people's concerns, information needs, and preferred information sources in relation to radiological and nuclear terrorism threats.
The article begins with a review of NCRP Report No. 138 and its unique emphasis on psychosocial and communication issues. This is followed by an examination of recent developments in each of the five broad areas noted above. The article then concludes by identifying some of the continuing psychosocial and communication challenges facing the nation as it moves to meet the threat of terrorism involving radioactive materials.
NCRP REPORT NO. 138: A NEW FOCUS ON PSYCHOSOCIAL AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES
The original request for what would become known as NCRP Report No. 138 came from the Office of Emergency Management in the Planning and Preparedness Division of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE was seeking a comprehensive analysis of the full range of crisis and consequence management issues posed by terrorism involving radioactive materials, and gave responsibility for the study to the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP).
Psychosocial consequences
Why was so much attention devoted to these issues? At the most basic level, said the report, "is the fact that one of terrorism's chief aims is psychological: to induce fear in a population." But the psychological component is far broader than the matter of fear, noted the report. Some of "the most difficult aspects of consequence management may relate to the social and psychological aftereffects of an incident."
A major terrorist incident involving radioactive materials could have tremendous psychological and behavioral consequences, affecting individuals, families, and communities. In the immediate aftermath of an incident, "thousands of people who fear possible exposure to radiation may stream into area medical centers to seek assistance," taxing even the best-prepared facilities and overwhelming others. The effects of an incident could be further compounded by social impacts such as stigma, where affected areas and their inhabitants come to be seen as "tainted," "contaminated," or "dangerous." On the broadest level, cautioned NCRP Report No. 138, were psychosocial issues of a national scope: maintaining or reestablishing public confidence, trust, and a sense of safety. These could be "a daunting but essential part" of efforts to address the consequences of an incident.
NCRP Report No. 138 did not suggest that the worst is inevitable, nor did it say that widespread, frenzied panic of the type seen in Hollywood disaster movies should be expected. Indeed, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack involving radioactive materials, many people and communities are likely to engage in helping behavior, altruism and other positive behavioral responses (Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Perry and Lindell 2003) .
At the same time, and as NCRP Report No. 138 strongly underlined, situations involving radiation and radioactive contamination have a remarkable capacity to produce widespread fear and anxiety, a profound sense of vulnerability, and a continuing sense of alarm and dread. Both research and real-world experience, said the report, have already clearly demonstrated that powerful behavioral responses and reactions can manifest themselves after radiological/nuclear incidents. The most dramatic example is probably the 1987 137 Cs contamination episode in Goiânia, Brazil (IAEA 1988; Petterson 1988; Collins and de Carvalho 1993) . In the aftermath of the incident, huge numbers of people-about 112,000 -streamed into special facilities asking to be monitored for signs of radiation. Some came from locations far removed from the site of the accident, even from other states. "The fear was so intense," noted a Brazilian psychologist, "that some people fainted in the queues as they approached their moment of monitoring. Many complained of vomiting and diarrhea. . . " (de Carvalho 1999 † ) . Various behavioral responses to incidents involving radioactive materials have been seen after other incidents as well, including large-scale voluntary evacuation, the development of stress-induced physical symptoms, and discrimination against individuals and products perceived as being from an affected area (Kasperson et al. 2003; de Carvalho 1999 † ; Becker 2001a Becker , 2002 . When this historical experience is coupled with the fact that a terrorist attack is an intentional act of mass violence intended to inflict pain, suffering, and death, it becomes clear, according to NCRP Report No. 138 , that a large-scale radiological/nuclear terrorism event has the potential to pose serious and long-lasting social, psychological and behavioral challenges.
The role of communication
In light of the wide array of potential effects, psychosocial issues and efforts to prevent short-and long-term adverse impacts urgently need more attention in all aspects of preparedness and response efforts. This includes developing a communication approach that "is informed by an awareness of people's fear and concerns and that effectively conveys the information needed to protect health and safety." Indeed, communication and information will have "a profound impact on the public's reaction to the event and the government response." Not paying sufficient attention to critical psychosocial and communication issues, warned the report, could result in failed efforts to manage an incident: "response efforts could be 'successful' in a technical sense, but a failure in terms of reducing morbidity and mortality and maintaining public trust and confidence."
An overview of NCRP Report No. 138's recommendations
After examining the critical importance of psychosocial and communication issues, NCRP Report No. 138 presented detailed information about the spectrum of potential effects, groups thought to be at greater risk for psychosocial impacts (e.g., mothers with young children), the potential magnitude of impacts, and the problem of stigma. This, in turn, was followed by a specific set of recommendations for more effectively addressing psychosocial and communication issues in planning, education, training, research, program development, and response operations. NCRP Report No. 138 stressed that "higher priority needs to be given to psychosocial issues" in weapons of mass destruction terrorism response plans. Furthermore, plans "should include provisions for dealing with the large number of people who may self-report" and should incorporate mechanisms for recognizing and assisting psychological casualties. Because a "medical response that lacks an adequate psychosocial component" may leave significant impacts unaddressed, and because a mental health component that is "totally divorced from the medical response is likely to be unsuccessful," it is important for the "medical and psychosocial components of the response effort" to be well integrated.
People seeking help, said the report, "should never be sent away or 'dismissed'; rather, individuals should be treated with respect, and their symptoms-regardless of cause-should be taken seriously." Because incidents involving radiation can influence people's decisions about pregnancy, abortion, etc., even in locations away from the incident, it is important to have counseling services available "to assist people who are making reproductive decisions in the aftermath of an incident." In addition, the report recommended that specialized materials be developed to help children understand the incident, since "there are few materials (e.g., coloring books or other items for children) focused specifically on radiological hazards."
In its recommendations on ways of improving training exercises, the report called not only for the inclusion of more psychosocial content but also for a more realistic mix. Training exercises "are only useful to the extent that they are similar to the conditions likely to be faced by responders." Toward this end, and to enhance the realism and robustness of exercises, the report recommended that radiological/nuclear terrorism exercises utilize a combination "of mock physical and mock psychological casualties-some with injuries, some with radiation exposure, some contaminated, and many others with acute stress-related symptoms (nausea, rashes)."
Recognizing that information and communication are crucial in the prevention and mitigation of socialbehavioral consequences, the report included a range of recommendations related to risk communication. It is vital that "information that is as accurate and complete as possible. . . be provided as early as possible." Language that is dismissive of people's concerns should not be used. Thus, "terms such as 'radiophobia' should be avoided." Finally, echoing the guiding principle that was enunciated in relation to psychosocial issues-"prevention"-the report called for "communications at all levels" to be "proactive and designed to protect public health and safety." To succeed, the overarching policy must be one that "recognizes that public health and safety are paramount."
KEY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE NCRP REPORT NO. 138
In the years since the 2001 publication of NCRP Report No. 138, a host of important developments have taken place in relation to psychosocial and communication issues. Many of these have served to implement, build upon, or expand the recommendations made in the Report. While space does not permit a full exploration of all developments, advances in five key areas are examined in the sections that follow: radiological and nuclear training exercises, where some efforts have been made to better incorporate psychosocial issues; new policy and guidance development related to psychosocial and communication issues; federally-sponsored roundtables that have explored psychosocial and communication issues as they relate to hospitals and healthcare facilities; survey research findings, which have improved our understanding of people's perceptions of the radiological/nuclear terrorism threat; and radiological/nuclear terrorism risk communication research and message development. Highlighted in this last area is the Pre-Event Message Development Project, a multi-year, federally funded risk communication research and message development effort begun in 2002. The project has dramatically increased our knowledge of people's concerns, information needs, and preferred information sources in relation to radiological/nuclear terrorism threats.
Radiological/nuclear terrorism training exercises
Since the publication of NCRP Report No. 138, various efforts have been made to increase the realism and robustness of radiological/nuclear training exercises by incorporating psychosocial and communication content. Some have taken place in exercises focused primarily on the state or local level. For example, in March 2002, the Center for Strategic and International Studies organized a tabletop exercise/workshop to help frame the planning requirements for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Participants included representatives from a variety of agencies, including police and fire services, emergency planning, health, and transportation. Private sector participants (e.g., utilities) were also included. In the exercise/workshop, which involved a radiological dispersal device (RDD) scenario, psychosocial and communication issues were significant. Among the potential impacts considered were workers refusing to return to work, tourists staying away from hotels, and parents refusing to send children to school. These sorts of potential impacts were seen as being "indicative of the deep, long-lasting psychological impact that a radiological attack could have."
Other efforts to consider psychosocial and communication issues have taken place at the federal level. By far the biggest civilian exercise to date involving a radiological terrorism scenario was TOPOFF 2 (known as "T2"). Organized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the multi-city exercise took place in May 2003. Dozens of U.S. federal agencies, state and local agencies, and Canadian agencies, were involved.
The Seattle, Washington, portion of the T2 exercise involved a large-scale RDD scenario (U.S. DHS 2003a) .
Unlike many previous federal exercises, the extensive "scenario description" document that was prepared for T2 devoted considerable attention to psychosocial issues. Included, for example, was a detailed discussion of the psychological effects of disasters and terrorist incidents. More significantly, information regarding the RDD event repeatedly focused attention on critical psychosocial and communication issues. For example, a characterization of possible events several days after the hypothetical RDD incident described fearful people going to emergency rooms and demanding diagnosis and treatment. In considering the hypothetical Seattle RDD, the scenario description also noted that fear of radioactive contamination could produce important behavioral impacts such as spontaneous and voluntary evacuation of buildings or neighborhoods not directly affected by the RDD explosion, as well as absenteeism or hesitation about going to work. Explaining that any indication of a "radioactive" event causes fear and uncertainty, the scenario description concluded that for many people, the psychological impact would be far more serious than the radiation health consequences.
In terms of actual exercise play, the Seattle portion of T2 included two very innovative components specifically focused on psychosocial issues. The first took place at Swedish Hospital in Seattle, which was one of the major healthcare facilities participating in the exercise. In addition to receiving mock radiation casualties from the RDD, the hospital conducted a psychological casualties exercise. Working on the assumption that the number of psychological casualties from many RDD scenarios would be much greater than the number of radiation casualties, hospital staff created a practice situation in which approximately two dozen distressed people suddenly came into the hospital concerned about radiation exposure, unusual symptoms, etc. It was the job of hospital staff members to quickly develop a way of assisting the walk-ins while at the same time not allowing the hospital to become paralyzed and unable to handle other incoming casualties from the RDD. A range of hospital staff contributed to, or participated in, the drill, including a radiation safety officer, a risk manager, social workers, nurses, hospital chaplains, and emergency department personnel.
The second component of T2 that focused on psychosocial issues took place in the areas behind the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital Center. The Washington State WA-1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), which is part of the National Disaster Medical System, conducted a patient care drill in which dozens of mock casualties arrived at one time at the DMAT operations area. Some of the mock casualties were symptomatic following radiation exposure, others had traumatic injuries, and many were mock psychological casualties. The psychological casualties ranged from mothers distressed about the effect of radiation on their children to individuals worried about radiation exposure and experiencing stress-induced physical symptoms. Several mock psychological casualties who felt their concerns were not being addressed even pretended to become uncooperative and unruly. The DMAT practiced a wide range of issues during the drill, from site security to how to manage a large influx of casualties. Like the drill at Swedish Hospital, the DMAT drill at the VA Medical Center was inventive and very useful in acquainting personnel with the substantial challenges posed by psychosocial issues in RDD events.
While organizers and participants at the Swedish and VA locations conducted their own debriefings, the overall T2 exercise unfortunately did not undertake a systematic effort to capture relevant information and insights from the two sites. Thus, although the original "scenario description" had characterized psychosocial issues as being important and potentially problematic in an RDD scenario, the official T2 After Action Summary Report for Public Release (U.S. DHS 2003a) ultimately included no discussion of these crucial issues. Despite this serious omission, however, the inclusion of psychosocial issues in the exercise scenario description and in exercise play meant that T2 still represented a step forward.
Policy and guidance development
Policy and guidance development is another area where important developments have taken place. Notable in this regard is a 2003 report prepared by the DHS Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Device Preparedness. Developed by the Medical Preparedness and Response Sub-Group, the document provided detailed guidance on a wide range of medical and health issues (U.S. DHS 2003b). Included were comprehensive medical guidelines for management of patients, including patient radiological assessment, immediate medical management, patient decontamination, the use of medical countermeasures, and dealing with deceased persons. In addition, the DHS report provided information on evacuation, sheltering, and other public health measures to reduce/avert radiation dose, as well as guidelines on radiological protection for first responders and first contact medical personnel.
Significantly, the DHS report also devoted a substantial portion of its attention and over a quarter of its pages to a consideration of psychosocial issues. Building on the foundation provided by NCRP Report No. 138, the DHS document noted that "an attack involving the release of radiation will create uncertainty, fear, and terror." Echoing NCRP Report No. 138's concerns, the DHS document cautioned that in an RDD event, "addressing psychological and behavioral issues. . . may be far more challenging, in terms of the number of people affected, than addressing the consequences of radiation exposure in the affected population."
The DHS report provided useful guidance on a range of issues, including psychological and behavioral consequence management, the role of healthcare providers, triage and initial disposition, the role of mental health professionals, early psychological interventions, principles of psychological first aid, evaluation and diagnosis, special populations, patient education, and communication between primary care providers and patients. Also discussed was the controversy over the usefulness of debriefing as a mental health intervention. Finally, information on psychosocial issues as they relate to responders was provided. This included guidance for managing stress in first responders, guidance for supervisors, and guidance for medical care providers of first responders.
Another effort organized by DHS produced significant progress on the topic of risk communication in radiological terrorism events. In June 2003, DHS and the American Nuclear Institute conducted a workshop with a small number of leading experts on nuclear/radiological terrorism, radiation control and protection, health physics, medicine, public health, psychosocial effects, and risk communication. Describing NCRP Report No. 138 as a "comprehensive sourcebook" that had identified issues federal, state, and local governments "need to address," the workshop sought to take the next step in the area of risk communication. More specifically, the aim was to identify concrete actions needed to improve risk communication in RDD situations. As a result of the workshop and various follow-on activities, DHS was provided with a detailed roadmap for improving risk communication in RDD events. The two DHS efforts described above, which were specifically focused on radiological terrorism issues, were complemented by several broader policy and guidance development efforts. ‡ In the report, which was the final report in the series, the panel urged greater attention to psychosocial issues. "The strategic vision offered here reflects the guiding principles. . . . It should include psychological preparedness." Toward this end, the Commission recommended that the IOM/NAS (2003) report be implemented, that Congress "provide increased funding. . . for an appropriate focus on psychological and behavioral consequences preparedness and management," and that the DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) "create a federal joint task force on these issues."
Identifying and understanding hospital and clinician needs
A third area that has seen progress in the period since the publication of NCRP Report No. 138 involves improvements in our understanding of the needs of hospitals and clinicians vis-a-vis radiological/nuclear terrorism situations. Noteworthy in this regard have been a number of federally sponsored roundtables organized by the Radiation Studies Branch at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta. The roundtables have brought together representatives from hospitals (including clinicians, administrators, community planners, communications personnel, and mental health staff); state and local emergency management agencies; professional associations; federal, state, and local public health agencies; and experts in risk communication and nuclear/radiological terrorism.
A January 2003 CDC roundtable (U.S. CDC 2003), for example, focused on hospital communications in a mass casualty radiological event. The program addressed the internal and external communications challenges faced by hospitals and clinicians before, during, and after a terrorist incident. Working in small groups as well as larger sessions, the participants sought to (1) determine what products/resources were needed for improving hospitals' communications with the public and internal audiences in a mass casualty radiological event, (2) determine approaches for implementing the priority recommendations, and (3) recommend messages or message themes for hospital communications with the public and internal audiences.
Along with a series of other recommendations, the participants recommended the development of a set of comprehensive, standardized communication "toolkits" that could be used by hospitals. The kits would contain a wide range of components needed for communication before, during, and after a radiological/nuclear event. Among the recommended items to be included would be a list of public information officers and other resources in the community; guidance for training volunteers to support the hospital's mass casualty communications; fact sheets on radiation, radiation exposure, contamination, health effects, etc.; audience-specific fact sheets for hospital staff, patients, visitors, etc.; message templates; educational materials for briefing staff on the signs, symptoms, and injuries associated with contamination, and the physical and psychosocial effects of radiation on staff, first responders, and patients; and information for helping staff cope with the psychological impact of such events. The CDC is currently developing these recommended toolkits.
Better understanding public perceptions and concerns: Survey research findings
Whereas the federally sponsored roundtables have produced a better understanding of hospital and clinician needs, a vast amount of survey work done over the past several years has greatly improved our understanding of public concerns and perceptions of the radiological/ nuclear terrorism threat. Among the most important sources of data are surveys carried out in August 2003. One survey was conducted by the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion on behalf of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness and the Children's Health Fund. The title of the poll was "How Americans Feel about Terrorism and Security: Two Years After 9/11." § One significant finding was that people appear to be less confident in the government's ability to protect them from an RDD than from various other threats. Nationally, only 49% of those polled indicated that they were either "very confident" or "confident" in the government's ability to protect against RDDs. who were "very confident" or "confident" that government could protect water supplies against chemical or biological attack; 59% who were "very confident" or "confident" in airport security; and 63% who were "very confident" or "confident" in government's ability to protect nuclear power facilities. The result was important because it demonstrated the public's clear sense of vulnerability with respect to radiological terrorism threats.
The same Marist poll also shed light on sources the public trusts to provide information in the event of a terrorist attack. When asked whom they would trust to "give accurate and reliable information about what is happening and what to do in the event of a terrorist attack," it was figures associated with health and healthcare that were ranked the highest. Topping the list was the CDC, with 84% of the population saying it would either "completely trust" or "somewhat trust" the agency to provide accurate and reliable information. Also high on the list, with percentages above 70: "Doctor who is expert" (83%), U.S. Surgeon General (76%), and the National Institutes of Health (75%). Figures or agencies with percentages below 70 included the Secretary of DHHS (69%), the DHS Secretary (68%), the President (65%), and the Attorney General (65%).
Shedding additional light on people's information preferences was the Pew Internet and American Life Project and Federal Computer Week Survey, conducted in August 2003.** When asked what type of information source they would turn to upon hearing that a terrorist attack had taken place in the community where they live, 54% of respondents said they would turn to television first, 15% said they would turn to radio first, and 8% said they would turn to news Web sites first. When asked to identify their second choice for information, 22% said radio would be the source they would use second, 25% named television, and 17% named news Web sites.
Other interesting findings with relevance to radiological/nuclear terrorism preparedness and response included the Pennsylvania State University Assessment of Perceived Media Influence and the Public Perspectives on the Mental Health Effects of Terrorism, a national poll carried out by Widmeyer Associates.
† † The latter survey provided further evidence of the stress associated with terrorism when it reported that Americans, by nearly a two-to-one margin, say "people experience more fear and distress about terrorism than they do a natural disaster." Risk communication research and message development for radiological/nuclear terrorism events NCRP Report No. 138 urged a "preventive approach" with respect to psychosocial issues, and one of the components that it saw as essential in this regard was more effective risk communication. It is precisely in this area that some of the most significant advances have taken place since NCRP Report No. 138 was published in 2001. Perhaps most notable in this regard is something called the Pre-Event Message Development Project. Known as the "Pre-Event" project, the multi-year effort was launched in 2002 and remains active today. In many ways, "Pre-Event" was a response to the experience that had been gained from the 2001 anthrax letter incidents. At the time of those incidents, the CDC quickly found itself struggling to meet the tremendous number of calls from the public, the large number of requests by health officials for real-time information, and the huge number of inquiries from the media. All of this occurred as agency personnel were already working furiously to assess and manage the anthrax incidents.
Reflecting on the experience, and learning valuable lessons from it, CDC came to the conclusion that risk communication in an unconventional terrorism situation would require a far more proactive approach and one that did as much as possible prior to the event. Ideally, basic, agent-specific messages would be crafted well before the occurrence of an event ("Pre-Event Messages"), and a set of various messages could be kept "at the ready" to be used immediately should an unconventional terrorist attack occur (Becker 2004) . To be effective, though, those messages would need to be built on a detailed understanding of the concerns and information needs of the public and other audiences, and all messages would need to be carefully tested. Clearly, this would be a major undertaking.
To move the process forward, CDC entered into a cooperative agreement with the Association of Schools of Public Health (ASPH) in 2002. On behalf of CDC, ASPH invited proposals for carrying out the ambitious research and message development work needed by CDC. After a highly competitive process, schools of public health at four universities were chosen to lead the effort: The University of Alabama at Birmingham, University of Oklahoma, Saint Louis University, and the University of Los Angeles at California.
To gain a better understanding of the perceptions, information needs, self-protection concerns, preferred information outlets, and trusted sources for a range of population groups, the four universities worked together to carry out dozens of focus groups across the United States. All focus groups involved the "rolling out" of a three-part hypothetical unconventional terrorism event.
The initial areas of focus selected by CDC were chemical, biological (plague and botulinum toxin), and radiological/nuclear. The lead responsibility for the radiological/nuclear area was given to the University of Alabama at Birmingham. As of 2004, a total of 42 focus groups involving a "radioactive materials terrorism event" had been carried out. Thirty of the groups were conducted with segments of the general public, while the other 12 were conducted with professional groups that would play a key role in managing a radiological/nuclear terrorism event (first responder, hospital emergency department, public health).
Analysis of the focus groups has already produced important findings with direct relevance to risk communication in radiological/nuclear terrorism situations. With respect to professionals, an important finding is that professionals continue to be concerned about the "newness" of the radiological/nuclear terrorism threat and the challenges it poses. A first responder put it this way: "This is novel. . . this is a new one." Another professional commented: "I just wonder if the training and equipment is up to it." Similarly, a healthcare professional commented: "Although we have drilled on this, I would be concerned about how prepared we are to take this on."
In addition, some professionals, particularly in public health, said they needed more information about what their role should be in a radiological/nuclear terrorism incident. "We are more involved if there is a biological attack," commented one professional. Asked another: "What role would one play in this?" Clearly, messages to professionals need to address these concerns and information needs.
Professionals were also concerned that they might be targeted, that phone lines and the broader 911 system could rapidly overload, that population flight would create additional problems such as congestion and road rage, and that healthcare facilities could be flooded with worried people, walk-ins, people self-reporting, people fearing that they may have been exposed. "Those that are being brought by ambulance is one thing, but you're going to have a deluge. . . brought here by private vehicle or they're going to walk in here. . . "
In addition, health department and hospital personnel were concerned that they would have to deal with demands for potassium iodide even if its use was not indicated. Said one health professional: "Everybody's going to want it." Commented another: "It doesn't matter that it's not recommended. They're not going to care." Along with their need for self-protection information, professionals will need information on ways to address these types of issues (NRC/NAS 2004) .
With respect to the general public, a crucial finding is that key terms found in many current radiological/ nuclear terrorism emergency information sheets or other materials can be confusing or unclear for some people. One such term is "shelter in place." While some focus group participants understood the meaning of this phrase, and while others were able to derive the meaning from context, others were unclear or confused as to the term's meaning. The following quotes illustrate the wide variety of interpretations:
• "Who provides shelter, the Red Cross?"
• "Shelter in place. What does it mean? Does it mean stay where you are?" • "I assume shelter in place means to go to the place that affords you the greatest protection." • "The word shelter sounds a little confusing. I think people hear shelter first thing and think, time to interpret that. If shelter means stay where you are at and stay covered, that would be more clear."
The term "shelter in place" is found in large numbers of local, state, and federal information sheets related to radiological/nuclear terrorism. Given the fact that some people clearly do not understand the term's meaning, and that it is subject to varying interpretations, it may be advisable either to re-think the use of this term or to ensure that it is better understood.
One additional general finding is also worth noting. A number of focus groups helped to identify another credible source of information that people might turn to in the event of an incident: the local television weather forecaster. Local weather persons were seen as an excellent and trustworthy source of information for several reasons. Television news meteorologists were seen to be apolitical and without an axe to grind: "Why would he tell us something he didn't believe in? It's not like he will be voted out of office." In addition, they were seen as having a familiarity with scientific issues. Finally, news meteorologists were seen as well known, familiar figures that people regularly watched for daily weather information or, more importantly, for updates on weather emergencies: "Usually, if something bad happens, it is weather. So when you go to the TV, there he is giving us the information." Clearly, some thought will need to be given to the role of television weather forecasters in providing people with information during an unconventional terrorist event.
These and other findings from the Pre-Event Project are not the final word. Focus groups are an excellent way to study verbal behavior and to gain a better understanding of people's self-reported concerns, views, and information needs. But people's responses to a hypothetical scenario as discussed in a focus group may not always be precisely the same as those in "real life" (Morgan 1988; Sorenson 2004) . Nevertheless, when considered alongside previous research and historical experience, the insights generated by the Pre-Event Project represent a major step forward. The Project has identified new information needs and trusted sources, flagged unclear terms and concepts, and provided valuable information about how to craft emergency messages for unconventional terrorism events.
Based on the full range of focus group and other findings, the Pre-Event Message Development Project is working closely with CDC to develop improved messages for use in radiological/nuclear terrorism situations and other events. Draft information spots are in development for television, radio, the Web and print media. Ultimately, such empirically grounded, audience-tested messages will play an important role in providing the public and professional groups with the timely, scientifically accurate information that they want and need to effectively cope with an incident.
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
As the above discussion indicates, some advances have taken place in relation to psychosocial and communication issues since the publication of NCRP Report No. 138. In many cases, NCRP Report No. 138's analysis and policy recommendations provided the foundation and some of the impetus for forward movement that helped produce those advances. Such was the case, for example, with DHS workshops and working groups. In other cases, developments were mainly a product of the postSeptember 11th environment in general, or more specific and growing concerns over RDDs and other forms of terrorism involving radioactive materials.
Despite the advances that have been made to date, much greater progress needs to be made for the nation's level of preparedness to be equal to the profound challenge posed by radiological/nuclear terrorism. This is not to undervalue the steps forward that have been made since NCRP Report No. 138; rather, it is to emphasize that that progress has been far too limited and incomplete.
There is still a need for additional effort to integrate psychosocial and communication components into radiological/nuclear terrorism preparedness and response plans. Many agencies and hospitals across the United States are only beginning to do so. In addition, agencies and hospitals still lack a well-developed template or protocol for handling and assisting large numbers of anxious and worried people coming in. Likewise, while there has been some forward movement in the effort to incorporate psychosocial issues into training exercises, far too many drills remain unrealistic because of their lack of such content. As NCRP Report No. 138 pointed out, exercises are only valuable when they prepare responders and others realistically.
The host of new research on psychosocial and communication issues represents a step forward. It is vital, however, for the process of translating key findings into improvements in planning and response to move ahead rapidly. This applies to such areas as risk communication and messaging for the general public, and it applies to concerns raised by professional groups. For example, evidence indicates that key components of the preparedness and response infrastructure feel less comfortable or less confident with radiological/nuclear issues. If professionals charged with managing an incident are uncertain, they may pass that uncertainty on to the public. This suggests a pressing need for more information, education, and training related to radiological and nuclear issues.
Then there is the problem of potassium iodide, or KI. Advertising for KI is popping up everywhere, from drug store checkout counters to the Internet. For example, many nuclear-related stories on the Web are now routinely accompanied by pop-up ads for KI. As people become more convinced that KI is a "magic pill" for all radiological/nuclear terrorism events, it will become even more important to get accurate information (such as that contained in the recent NRC/NAS report) to the public and professional groups.
The recommendation of the Gilmore Panel that DHS and DHHS create a federal joint task force on psychosocial issues represents an excellent idea. To be most effective, however, the panel needs to emulate the model established by NCRP: the task force should include not only federal agencies but also representatives from other levels of government, the academic research community, and professional societies. Furthermore, because psychosocial and communication issues are so closely linked, the task force should include expertise in both areas. In addition, it will be important for the task force to consider ways of enhancing the resilience of American society in the face of the unconventional terrorism threat. The threat, after all, is going to be with us for a long time, and we have made precious little progress in preparing American society psychologically.
At the broadest level, as local, state, and federal agencies move to meet the challenge of radiological/ nuclear terrorism, there remains a pressing need to understand psychosocial and communication issues as strategic factors in preparedness and response (Becker 2001b) . As NCRP Report No. 138 went to great lengths to emphasize, psychosocial and communication issues are central to the equation, and how they are handled will go a long way toward determining whether efforts to manage a radiological/nuclear terrorist event are a success or a failure. Failure to manage such an event will result in a loss of public confidence and amount to a victory for terrorism. That is simply not an option. Therefore, continued attention to psychosocial and communication issues needs to remain a high priority in the coming years.
